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Abstract 
This paper engages with one debate in the emerging field of neuroethics. It is sometimes 
claimed on the strength of neuroscientific research that our actions are causally 
determined and therefore not truly free, or more modestly that brain structures or 
processes constrain some choices and actions, raising questions about our moral 
responsibility for them. I argue that a Reformed account of providence, sin and grace 
offers an account of causation able to resist hard determinism, reframes concepts of 
freedom and responsibility, and provides a theological perspective for evaluating 
medical interventions in brain activity. Thus the paper not only contributes to a 
neuroethical debate, but also illustrates the capacity of Reformed ethics to respond 
creatively to novel problems.Keywords 
Neuroethics; neuroscience and theology; freewill; determinism; causation; providence; 
sin; Reformed ethics; Barth. 
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I/ Introduction 
Recent research in neuroscience has achieved great advances in understanding the 
workings of the human brain, and this growth in knowledge and understanding has 
raised a range of questions for ethics. These range from the highly theoretical (for 
example, what might research on the neuroscience of moral decision-making imply for 
normative ethical theory?) to the very practical (for instance, how and when might it be 
permissible to modify the workings of the brain?). Some of these questions are fairly 
familiar to philosophical and theological ethics, others less so. In response to such 
developments, the field of neuroethics has emerged in recent years, gathering this 
cluster of questions together under one roof, so to say.  
In this paper I explore briefly how a Christian ethic located in a broadly 
Reformed theological tradition might engage one of those questions: how does 
neuroscience affect our understanding of human freedom and moral responsibility? 
First, I specify a little more fully the questions that neuroscience raises about freedom 
and responsibility. Next I discuss one of those questions, concerning the relationship 
between determinism and freewill. There follows a proposal for what we might 
understand theologically by freedom and responsibility, particularly in light of a 
Christian doctrine of sin: does ‘ought’ really imply ‘can’? The paper concludes with an 
exploration of the response this theological understanding of freedom, responsibility 
and sin might offer to some of the particular problem cases discussed at the outset. 
The paper thus has a dual aim. It is intended as a contribution to the discussion 
of a specific neuroethical question, bringing a theological voice into a discussion often 
dominated by neuroscience and philosophy. As such, though, it also serves as a test case 
of the capacity of a broadly Reformed theological ethic to address novel problems, 
bringing core themes and emphases from this tradition to bear on new contexts and the 
questions they raise.  
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II/ Questions from neuroscience 
1. Is our freedom ‘only a self-delusion’? 
The neuroscientific study best known for raising questions about freewill dates from the 
1980s, when Benjamin Libet and his colleagues first performed an experiment in which 
participants were asked to flick a switch and report the time at which they had decided 
to do so. Libet et al. found that the ‘readiness potential’, a characteristic pattern of brain 
activity which occurs in advance of voluntary muscle movements, could be detected 
before the time at which participants reported they had decided to flick the switch.1  
The philosophical significance of this (if any) has been much debated. Libet’s 
finding has been interpreted to mean, in Michael Gazzaniga’s words, that ‘before you 
are aware that you’re thinking about moving your arm, your brain is at work preparing 
to make that movement!’2 This in turn has sometimes been taken to mean, as Edward O. 
Wilson once put it, that ‘our freedom is only a self-delusion’.3 To put it in more 
rigorous language, it has been taken to support hard determinism: the view that freewill 
is incompatible with causally deterministic brain processes, and since the physical 
processes of the brain are deterministic, there cannot be true freewill.4 And if that is the 
case, it is often taken also to rule out the possibility of genuine moral responsibility – 
though some authors argue that even if freedom and responsibility are fictions, they are 
nonetheless useful fictions for society to maintain.5 
                                                          
1 Benjamin Libet, 'Do We Have Free Will?' Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6 (1999), pp. 47- 57. 
2 Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Mind’s Past (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), p. 73, 
quoted by Daniel C. Dennett, Freedom Evolves (London: Allen Lane, 2003), p. 230. 
3 Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 71. 
4 I make use here of the standard terminology of freewill and determinism, in which compatibilists hold 
that determinism and free will are compatible, incompatibilists that they are not; incompatibilists are 
further subdivided into hard determinists, who hold that determinism is true and rule out freewill, and 
libertarians, who affirm freewill and reject determinism (see Dennett, Freedom Evolves, pp. 97–8). A 
further possible position is that regardless of whether determinism is true or not, there can be no freewill: 
see Galen Strawson, ‘The Bounds of Freedom’, in Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 441-60. 
5 Robert Wright, The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life (London: Abacus, 
1996), pp. 349-58. 
4 
Messer, Neil (2015) Determinism, Freedom and Sin: Reformed Theological Resources for a 
Conversation with Neuroscience and Philosophy. Studies in Christian Ethics, 28 (2). pp. 163-
174. Copyright © 2015 Neil Messer. Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications. 
Available online at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0953946815570591  
 
2. Are we less free than we like to think? 
Even if neuroscience does not entail hard determinism, it might question whether our 
actions are as freely chosen as we like to think. The website of the Oxford Centre for 
Neuroethics claims that ‘there is already extensive evidence that our ability to make 
rational choices is constrained in unexpected ways.’6 To give a few examples:  
 a range of stimuli can influence subjects’ decision-making without their being 
aware of it;7  
 there appear to be neurological influences on addiction, among other things 
making it more difficult for addicts than others to delay the gratification of their 
desires;8  
 studies of ‘ego-depletion’ suggest that the more self-control subjects have 
exercised in the recent past, the harder they find it to do so again: the responsible 
self may be, in the words of one paper, ‘a limited resource’;9 
 impulsive or antisocial behaviour might be harder for adolescents than adults to 
resist, because areas of the brain involved in executive control are not yet fully 
developed;10  
 executive control varies in strength among adults too, and tends to be weaker, 
for example, among those serving prison sentences.11 
If neuroscience does reveal hidden constraints on our freedom of choice and action, 
what might this imply for our moral responsibility? Assuming the Kantian principle that 
                                                          
6 Anon., ‘Free Will & Addiction’, The Oxford Centre for Neuroethics website, online at 
http://www.neuroethics.ox.ac.uk/research/area_3 (accessed 16 June 2014). 
7 A. Kiesel et al., 'Unconscious manipulation of free choice in humans', Consciousness and Cognition 15 
(2006), pp. 397-408. 
8 C.A.Boettiger et al., 'Immediate reward bias in humans: fronto-parietal networks and a role for the 
catechol-methyltransferase genotype', Journal of Neuroscience 27 (2007), pp. 14383-91. 
9 R.F. Baumeister et al., 'Ego-depletion: Is the active self a limited resource?', Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 74 (1998), pp. 1252-65. 
10 Margaret Beckman, ‘Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain’, Science 305 (2004), pp. 596-9. 
11 Anon., ‘Free Will & Addiction’. 
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‘ought’ implies ‘can’, if a neurobiological constraint on my freedom were so severe as 
to make it effectively impossible for me to do something, presumably I could not be 
obliged to do it, or blamed after the event for having done it. If my neurobiology merely 
made it difficult, not impossible, then presumably it could still be an obligation – 
though perhaps my failure should be judged less harshly, as some commentators also 
argue in the arena of criminal justice.12 To repeat: all this follows if ‘ought’ implies 
‘can’: I shall return to that ‘if’ later. 
 
II/ Neuroscience, determinism and freedom13 
As I noted earlier, Libet’s finding about the timing of the readiness potential has 
sometimes been taken to mean that supposedly voluntary actions are not really 
voluntary: ‘before you are aware that you’re thinking about moving your arm, your 
brain is at work preparing to make that movement’.14 However, philosophers of mind 
who wish to argue for a compatibilist view – that a deterministic view of brain activity 
is compatible with freewill – do not have much difficulty resisting this inference. For 
example, Daniel Dennett thinks it odd (at least for non-dualists) to make Gazzaniga’s 
distinction between you and your brain.15 That distinction implies that the real ‘you’ 
inhabits a kind of control centre in the brain, where it simultaneously issues instructions 
and is aware of issuing them. If that were so, it would indeed be perplexing to find that 
the commander-in-chief was not issuing commands until after his or her subordinates 
                                                          
12 For example, Beckman (op. cit.) raises the question whether, because their executive control functions 
are not yet fully developed, juvenile offenders should be sentenced more leniently than adults who 
commit the same offences. 
13 Some of the discussion in this section and the next draws on aspects of the longer account in Neil 
Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and Ethical Reflections in Evolutionary Biology 
(London: SCM, 2007), pp. 145-58.  
14 Above, note 2. 
15 Dennett, Freedom Evolves, pp. 227-42. 
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had begun to implement them.16 However, if instead we think of decision-making as a 
process that takes time and involves various parts of the brain, then the problem seems 
to dissolve. As Dennett puts it, ‘You are not out of the loop; you are the loop.’17 
However, even if Libet’s findings by themselves do not entail hard determinism, 
might the achievements and future prospects of neuroscience, taken together, support a 
hard determinist view? If it is in principle possible to describe a complete sequence of 
cause and effect from sensory input through brain activity to action, does that mean that 
there is no explanatory space left for free and reasoned decision-making? 
To address this question, it is necessary to explore briefly what we might mean 
by ‘freedom’. David Hume famously distinguished between liberty of spontaneity and 
liberty of indifference:18 by liberty of spontaneity he meant freedom from force, 
coercion or constraint on our actions, whereas liberty of indifference denotes radical 
unpredictability. Confusingly, different positions on freewill and determinism are often 
associated with different understandings of freedom. Libertarians (incompatibilists who 
defend the reality of freewill) tend to regard liberty of indifference as a necessary part of 
that freewill.19 Alan Torrance, for example, holds that ‘genuine indeterminacy in human 
agency’ is needed to allow space for responsibility, accountability and even 
rationality.20 Compatibilists may be more interested in the liberty of spontaneity, 
holding that an action is free insofar as it is not compelled or coerced, but done for 
reasons the actor can own. Can an action be ‘done for a reason’, though, if it is the 
                                                          
16 This is reminiscent of a running joke in the 1970s television comedy M*A*S*H, in which successive 
Commanding Officers of the 4077th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital were subjected to Company Clerk 
Radar O’Reilly’s disconcerting habit of knowing what they wanted before they themselves knew, and 
repeating their instructions back to them before they had spoken those instructions. 
17 Dennett, Freedom Evolves, p. 242. 
18 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 407. 
19 To avoid confusion, it should be noted that this use of ‘libertarian’ is distinct from the sense in which it 
is used in political philosophy. 
20 Alan Torrance, ‘Developments in Neuroscience and Human Freedom: Some Theological and 
Philosophical Questions’, Science and Christian Belief 16 (2004), pp. 123–37, at p. 127.  
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outcome of a deterministic sequence of physical cause and effect? Nancey Murphy is 
well known for what she calls a non-reductive physicalist view in which the answer is 
‘Yes’.21 In this account, mental events such as reasoning and decision-making 
‘supervene’ on the physical events in the brain with which they are correlated. Murphy 
uses the analogy of an electronic calculator, which conforms both to physical laws and 
mathematical logic because it has been designed so that ‘its causal processes model 
arithmetic transformations.’22 Human brains are not programmed by software designers 
in the same way as calculators, but Murphy proposes that by responding to feedback 
from their environment, they could become structured in such a way that its causal 
processes also correspond to rational operations, decisions and so forth. 
Murphy’s view has been challenged by Jaegwon Kim and others, on the grounds 
that if a complete sequence of physical cause and effect can be described covering 
decision-making and action, then Murphy’s supervenient mental processes seem 
redundant, with no causal or explanatory work left to do.23 In a later section I shall 
return to Kim’s objection and suggest that Christians need not be persuaded by it. 
Before that, however, it is necessary to consider a different kind of critique made by 
authors such as Alan Torrance: that Murphy’s notion of freedom undermines moral 
responsibility. 
 
                                                          
21 For a presentation and critical discussion of Murphy’s non-reductive physicalism, see Nancey Murphy, 
‘Physicalism without Reductionism: Toward a Scientifically, Philosophically and Theologically Sound 
Portrait of Human Nature’, Philip Clayton, ‘Shaping the Field of Theology and Science: A Critique of 
Nancey Murphy’ and Dennis Bielfeldt, ‘Nancey Murphy’s Nonreductive Physicalism’, Zygon 34 (1999), 
pp. 551-71, 609-618 and 619-28 respectively. 
22 Nancey Murphy, ‘The Problem of Mental Causation: How Does Reason Get its Grip on the Brain?’, 
Science and Christian Belief 14 (2002), pp. 143-57, at p. 146. 
23 See, e.g., Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For 
a summary and critical discussion of Kim’s position, see Teed Rockwell, ‘Physicalism, Non-reductive,’ in 
Chris Eliasmith (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind, online at 
https://sites.google.com/site/minddict/physicalism-non-reductive (article last updated May 2004, accessed 
9 November 2014). 
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III/ Freedom, responsibility and sin: does ‘Ought’ imply ‘Can’? 
Torrance believes that Murphy’s notion of freedom is too easily reduced to ‘the 
uninterrupted outworkings of … brain states with respect to which no external 
constraints are registered’. This, he argues, could lead us to see the whole range of 
human behaviour from the admirable to the atrocious as expressions of ‘brain states 
with respect to which the relevant agents have no responsibility.’24  
The libertarian view defended by Torrance has some difficulties of its own. For 
one thing, it faces the considerable challenge of giving a plausible account of the 
relationship between brain and mind that can account for the liberty of indifference. 
Moreover, as Torrance acknowledges, emphasising the latter could lead us to make 
unpredictability, randomness or arbitrariness the criteria for judging an action free. Yet 
we are accustomed to thinking that agents still act freely – perhaps more than ever – 
when they are motivated by their most deep-seated desires, commitments or goals, even 
though such actions might be far from arbitrary or unpredictable. However, I leave these 
difficulties aside in order to probe a little further Torrance’s moral critique of Murphy. 
Torrance holds that non-reductive physicalism can support only the liberty of 
spontaneity, and therefore erodes moral responsibility. Is he correct?  
We can begin to assess this claim by noticing that the western Christian tradition 
has tended to think of freedom in rather different terms from either of Hume’s 
alternatives. Both liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference depict freedom as 
what Alistair McFadyen calls a ‘neutral suspension between different possibilities’ – for 
example, to do or to disobey God’s will.25 In that case, the liberty of spontaneity will be 
the absence of coercion or constraint directing us to one of these possibilities rather than 
another; the liberty of indifference will be a ‘genuine indeterminacy’ (as Torrance puts 
                                                          
24 Torrance, ‘Developments in Neuroscience and Human Freedom’, p. 129, emphasis original. 
25 Alistair McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 168. 
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it) in our choice between them. Looking back to the Pelagian controversy, McFadyen 
attributes this view of freedom (liberum arbitrium indifferentiae) to the Pelagians, and 
suggests that in Augustine’s view this is not freedom at all, but a symptom of ‘the will’s 
bondage to sin’.26 If I reserve my freedom to do or to refuse God’s will, I am already 
holding myself back from God, and that is a form of sin as pride. So Augustine argues 
in the City of God that the greatest freedom consists in the inability to sin: ‘the first 
freedom of will which man received … consisted in an ability not to sin, but also in an 
ability to sin; whereas this last freedom of will [the freedom enjoyed by the blessed in 
the heavenly city] shall be superior, inasmuch as it shall not be able to sin.’27 
In this Augustinian perspective, however, our present human condition is one in 
which our wills are not bound in this way to the good, but to sin. As McFadyen puts it, 
this bondage to sin is understood as radical, communicable, contingent and yet 
universal.28 It did not have to be this way, but without exception in the world as we 
experience it, it is. We are born into lives, relationships and social structures distorted 
by sin; and so distorted, we come in time to make our own contributions to that 
distortion. Our freedom to bind our wills indissolubly to the good is radically 
compromised by this condition of sinfulness. Does this suggest that we are not 
accountable or culpable for our sinful choices and actions? If we accept the Kantian 
view that ‘Ought’ implies ‘Can’, it would seem so. If our condition makes us unable to 
orient ourselves to the good, we cannot be held responsible for failing to do so. But the 
view I have just outlined disagrees. Even though we cannot free ourselves from our sin, 
we are still guilty of it.  
                                                          
26 McFadyen, Bound to Sin, p. 164. 
27 Augustine, The City of God (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series 1, vol. 2, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. 
Marcus Dods, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1886) xxii.30, emphasis added. Available online at 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.i.html (accessed 8 December 2014). 
28 Bound to Sin, pp. 16-18. 
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As Roger White has shown, what is going on here is really an argument between 
two contrasting moral visions, which has occurred repeatedly with variations in the 
history of Christian thought.29 In one vision (which we might call Pelagian), praise and 
blame are foregrounded. A central question is: Can I justly be blamed for doing X or 
failing to do Y? The answer is: Only if I am capable of doing Y and avoiding X; and a 
good Pelagian will insist that I am, so I have no excuse. In the opposing vision (which 
we might call Augustinian), praise- and blameworthiness are not absent from the 
picture, but they are no longer the most important or interesting questions. As White 
says, they should be raised only after others have been asked.30 In this moral vision, the 
central question could be expressed as: In what state or condition do I stand before 
God? According to White, something like this argument between moral visions is 
played out in Luther’s dispute with Erasmus concerning the freedom of the will,31 and 
later on (very roughly speaking) Kant takes the same side as Erasmus on a secularised 
version of the same issue. 
Does ‘Ought’ imply ‘Can’? On the view I have labelled ‘Augustinian’, not 
necessarily. In Luther’s words, ‘[i]t is dangerous to believe that the existence of a law 
implies that it can be obeyed, for the law is fulfilled by the grace of God.’32 We can still 
be guilty of sin (not in the modern sense of mere blameworthiness, but in the sense that 
we stand before God in a sinful condition, which we perpetuate and compound by our 
own sinful choices and actions) even when it is not fully in our power not to sin. 
 
                                                          
29 Roger M. White, ‘“Ought” Implies “Can”: Kant and Luther, a Contrast’, in George MacDonald Ross 
and Tony McWalter (eds.), Kant and his Influence (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990), pp. 1-72. 
30 ‘“Ought” Implies “Can”’, p. 71. 
31 Martin Luther, ‘Disputation against Scholastic Theology’, in Luther: Early Theological Works, Library 
of Christian Classics, vol. 16 (trans. James Atkinson, London: SCM, 1962), pp. 266-73; Erasmus, ‘On the 
Freedom of the Will’, trans. E. Gordon Rupp and A. N. Marlow, in Luther and Erasmus, Library of 
Christian Classics, vol. 17 (London: SCM, 1969), pp. 35-97. 
32 Luther, ‘Disputation’, p. 270. 
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IV/ Neuroscience, sin and grace 
How might this theological understanding of freedom, responsibility and sin address the 
questions raised by neuroscience, which I outlined earlier? The first of those was 
whether neuroscience entails, or at any rate supports, the hard determinist view that 
there is no genuine freewill.  
We can gain some theological purchase on this question by considering again 
the kind of objection to Murphy’s non-reductive physicalism put forward by critics like 
Kim: if one physical event in the brain is a sufficient cause of another, then there 
appears to be no explanatory work left for supervenient mental events to do, and it is 
hard to see how one mental event can be said to ‘cause’ another in any significant sense. 
Murphy herself has offered various responses to this critique.33 Apart from her specific 
points, however, it should be noted that Kim’s objection seems to presuppose a univocal 
view of causation, in which the existence of one true and complete causal explanation 
excludes the possibility of additional true causal explanations of the same event. By 
contrast Christian thinkers – seeking to do justice to divine sovereignty, human 
creatures’ freedom and responsibility, and the physical necessities to which those 
creatures are subject – have often maintained richer and more complex understandings 
of causation, in which more than one true causal story can be told about the same 
events. For example, Karl Barth observes that early Lutheran and Reformed 
dogmaticians affirmed God’s governance of the world against both ‘the Stoic doctrine 
of fate’ and ‘the Epicurean doctrine of chance’.34 It is perhaps not too wayward to see in 
the opposition of ‘fate’ to ‘chance’ a rough counterpart to modern oppositions between 
determinism and the kind of radical indeterminacy that some libertarians see as a 
condition of freewill. If a doctrine of divine governance could steer a middle course 
                                                          
33 See Murphy, ‘The Problem of Mental Causation’. 
34 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III/3, trans. G. W. Bromiley and R. J. Ehrlich (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1960), p. 162. 
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between fatum and fortuna, perhaps it also has the resources to transcend present-day 
disputes between determinists and libertarians. 
According to Barth, God’s governance of the world transcends and uses both 
creaturely freedom and necessity, and there is no contradiction between divine 
sovereignty and creaturely freedom: ‘The freedom of [the creature’s] activity does not 
exclude but includes the fact that it is controlled by God. It is God who limited it by law 
and necessity and it is God who created it free.’35 Creaturely freedom, says Barth, 
operates on the basis, and within the framework and limits, of divine permission. This 
limitation is in no way a compulsion laid on the creature, but is rather a necessary 
condition of genuine creaturely freedom: the attempt to act outside the limit of divine 
permission would be a self-destructive effort to claim godlike freedom. Moreover, he 
continues, ‘all creaturely activity aims at a certain effect’, but the goal and the outcome 
are beyond the creature’s control: 
Whether the effect comes, and if so how it comes, is a completely new 
factor in relation to the activity. This is true whether we consider it from 
the standpoint of necessity or from that of freedom. And if it is God who 
controls creaturely occurrence and not fate or chance, then we have to say 
quite baldly that the decisive moment, the very meaning of creaturely 
activity, its effect, and the goal or end in which it culminates, are all the 
gift and dispensation of God.36 
In other words, every aspect of a creature’s activity – including the material conditions 
that make it possible, the physical cause and effect that it involves and the goal to which 
it is directed – are governed and given space by the providence of God. Although Barth 
is not offering a theory of causation, he articulates a vision in which God’s governance 
of creation gives enough headroom (so to say) for diverse kinds of creaturely causality 
                                                          
35 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/3, p. 166. 
36 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/3, p. 166. 
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to coexist. Without depending on Aristotelian substance metaphysics (of whose use by 
theologians Barth is of course profoundly suspicious), this account of divine governance 
can incorporate a good deal of what is in view in the Aristotelian scheme of material, 
formal, efficient and final causes. As such it broadens the perspective considerably 
compared to modern discussions, framed by neuroscience, which often proceed on the 
tacit assumption that efficient causes are the only ones to be considered. 
This  
The purpose of this account is not to set up some kind of analogy in which 
divine providence is to creaturely freedom as human reason and will are to the physical 
processes of the brain.37 Nor does it presuppose a particular understanding of the soul or 
its relationship to the body. What I am suggesting is that it keeps open a space within 
which even a physicalist view of brain and mind does not entail the hard-determinist 
conclusion that there is no genuine freedom or moral responsibility. In other words, 
Christians who wish to think with the Reformed tradition about determinism and 
freewill need not be constrained by a naturalist framing of the problem. The physical 
laws by which brains operate, the particular structures and workings of a particular 
individual’s brain, the experiences to which that individual responds and the goal that 
she seeks in making a decision ‘are all the gift and dispensation of God’. That being the 
case, a cause-and-effect explanation of the physical processes occurring in her brain as 
she makes her decision is not a zero-sum alternative to an account of her reasons, or a 
teleological explanation in terms of the goods and goals to which her decision is 
directed. 
                                                          
37 Compare Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III/2, trans. Harold Knight, G. W. Bromiley, J. K. S. Reid 
and R. H. Fuller (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1960), pp. 340-1, which sets up a similar analogy of 
relationship between God’s relation to humanity and the soul’s relation to the body. Such analogies may 
well be valid; my account, however, does not depend on them, but only on an understanding of divine 
providence as the guarantor both of creaturely freedom and creaturely causation. 
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Our second set of questions was raised by neuroscientific evidence that human 
beings’ freedom of choice and action may be constrained in hitherto unsuspected ways 
by aspects of human neurobiology. We might instinctively feel troubled by evidence of 
hidden constraints on our freedom. However, Christians who hold the theological view 
of freedom, responsibility and sin outlined in the previous section should be remarkably 
untroubled by such claims. For one thing, some of the constraints that are said to exist 
may simply be aspects of our creaturely finitude that we did not know about until now; 
in Christian perspective it should never be a cause for regret that as finite creatures, we 
cannot do everything we wish we could. Moreover, the Christian tradition might not 
have much of a stake in the kind of freedom called into question by neuroscience. I 
suggested earlier that theology should not be interested primarily in either Hume’s 
‘liberty of indifference’ or ‘liberty of spontaneity’: the freedom that matters most to 
Christians is the freedom to orient oneself fundamentally to the good. That freedom is 
compromised not by our creaturely finitude, but by our sinfulness, our fallen condition: 
the radical alienation from God that we are both born into and perpetuate through our 
own willing and choosing.38  
However, the development of neural structures, pathways and mechanisms is 
significantly shaped by a person’s experiences and relationships, particularly through 
childhood and adolescence. Individual variants of brain structure and function can be 
seen as a physical ‘sediment’ (to borrow a metaphor from Alistair McFadyen) of a 
particular personal history of experiences, relationships and social environment.39 If 
aspects of that personal history are distorted by sin (as they are for all of us, in different 
ways), we might expect that distortion to leave its traces in the brain. Perhaps, therefore, 
some of the constraints on freedom mapped by neuroscience can be understood 
                                                          
38 Cf. McFadyen, Bound to Sin, pp. 126-30. 
39 Alistair I. McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social 
Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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theologically as ways in which individual, corporate or structural sin compromises our 
freedom to orient ourselves to the good.  
For example, there is abundant evidence that childhood trauma or abuse affects 
the development of brain structures and functions in multiple, interconnected and 
lasting ways.40 Among other things, it can disrupt the development of neurobiological 
structures and systems involved in homeostasis (the maintenance of the body’s internal 
environment), learning, memory, and executive control. Effects can include difficulties 
in personal and social relationships, hypersensitivity to perceived threats and stressors, a 
poor sense of self, inattention, impulsiveness, and aggression. Many people so affected 
are prone to self-destructive or criminal forms of behaviour as adolescents or adults.41 
To describe this state of affairs theologically: such individuals are egregiously sinned 
against, and find themselves enmeshed in a context distorted by sin, which may precede 
their own capacity for understanding, willing, choosing and acting. The development of 
their understanding, volition and action is distorted by that context and co-opted into 
that sinful dynamic, so that their own perceptions, choices and acts in their turn take 
forms distorted by sin, such as violent aggression. A crucial point, theologically 
speaking, is that this is simply an extreme and visible instance of our common human 
condition: the will’s bondage to sin, which we all share in one way or another.42 
To give a second example, the neurobiology of self-control and addiction also 
invites theological analysis. As I noted earlier, studies of ego-depletion are taken to 
suggest that self-control could be a ‘limited resource’.43 Some commentators link this to 
evidence of neurobiological factors which influence people’s susceptibility to 
                                                          
40 For a detailed review, see Bessel A. van der Kolk, ‘The Neurobiology of Childhood Trauma and 
Abuse’, Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America 12 (2003), pp. 293-317. 
41 van der Kolk, ‘The Neurobiology of Childhood Trauma’, pp. 297-300. 
42 McFadyen makes this point about child abuse and about the Holocaust, the two ‘concrete pathologies’ 
he discusses in his treatment of sin: Bound to Sin, pp. 49-50. 
43 Baumeister et al., ‘Ego-depletion’. 
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addiction.44 Such work might ‘flesh out’ (so to say) our understanding of the condition 
that Aristotelian and Christian traditions have named akrasia, incontinence or weakness 
of will.  
The relationship between addiction, freewill and sin is complex. The 
philosopher Neil Levy argues that the experience of addiction raises questions for 
standard philosophical accounts of autonomy.45 Addictive behaviour may be 
subjectively experienced as chosen rather than compulsive or coerced; at the time it is 
done, it appears as the preferred alternative, even if beforehand or afterwards the person 
strongly wishes to avoid it. According to Levy, this is best understood not as a loss of 
the capacity for autonomous decision-making, but a failure to integrate one’s desires 
and volitions into a coherent life-project. In similar vein, Christopher Cook considers 
alcohol dependence in terms of first- and second-order volitions.46 One might have a 
second-order volition, a long-term desire, to be sober; but that second-order desire is 
easily overwhelmed by the immediate first-order desire to satisfy the craving for drink. 
With reference to Paul and Augustine, Cook offers an illuminating theological analysis 
of addiction as sin, understood in terms of the divided will or self (‘I do not do the good 
I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do’, Rom. 7:19). Importantly, he too 
emphasizes that this is one, perhaps extreme, instance of a common human condition: 
perhaps not all of us are addicts, but we are all sinners with divided selves.47  
We stand before God in a fallen condition, our wills bound not to the good, but 
to sin: to a fundamental distortion in our relationship with God, a distortion that we both 
inherit and willingly contribute to, which in its turn spawns distorted relations with one 
another, ourselves and the created world. We are unable to free ourselves by our own 
                                                          
44 Anon., ‘Free Will & Addiction’. 
45 Neil Levy, ‘Autonomy and Addiction’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2006), pp. 427-48. 
46 Christopher C. H. Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), ch. 6. 
47 Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, pp. 164-6. 
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efforts from this binding of the will. Rather, what sets us free is God’s liberating Word 
(in) Jesus Christ. That being the case, what should we make of technological attempts to 
modify the workings of the brain – such as drugs or surgery – aimed at alleviating what 
I have described as the physical traces left on the brain by sin? Are they to be 
understood as instruments of God’s saving work? Or are they attempts to substitute 
human action for that saving work: instances of the human pride which, as Barth says, 
wants to be its own helper and so turns us away from the divine source of our true 
help?48 Cook discusses this question in relation to the treatment of alcohol dependence, 
in a way that demonstrates the complexity of the issue but does not fully resolve it.49 On 
the one hand, for example, he sees in the twelve-step programme of Alcoholics 
Anonymous, with its appeal to a ‘Higher Power’, a recognition of the need for divine 
assistance. On the other, he argues that therapeutic techniques and ‘anti-craving’ drugs 
‘are grace of a kind, and do produce a form of salvation’ – a form, however, which is 
oriented not to God but to ‘human freedom and fulfilment.’50 
Perhaps we can gain further clarity here by means of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s 
distinction between the ultimate and the penultimate.51 The ultimate – God’s last word 
of judgment and salvation in Christ – judges and sets at nought all our merely-human 
efforts to save ourselves. But it also validates those human efforts as penultimate 
activities: forms of responsible human action in the world that can help to prepare the 
way for the coming of grace. Feeding the hungry, housing the homeless, befriending the 
lonely, giving order to the undisciplined and freeing the enslaved can all be forms of 
penultimate activity, which can prepare the way for the coming of grace into these 
                                                          
48 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. IV/1, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956), pp. 
458-78. 
49 Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, pp. 186-9. 
50 Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, p. 188, citing Doctrine Commission of the Church of 
England, The Mystery of Salvation (London: Church House Publishing, 1997), pp. 31-40. 
51 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 6, ed. Ilse Tödt et al., trans. Reinhard 
Krauss, Charles C. West and Douglas W. Stott, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2005), pp. 146-70.  
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people’s lives by removing obstacles that would inhibit them from responding to God’s 
justifying word.52 It has sometimes been argued that medicine and healthcare can 
likewise have this penultimate character, curing or alleviating conditions that inhibit 
patients from responding to God’s liberating command to ‘will to be healthy’.53 Similar 
clinical techniques and practices, however, could acquire a very different meaning were 
they to be used in an attempt to transcend human creaturely limits as such: uses of this 
sort would be much more reminiscent of that aspect of pride which Barth calls ‘[t]he 
attempt at self-help’.54 
When we consider clinical interventions to address what I have called the 
physical traces left on the brain by sin, the line between responsible penultimate activity 
and hubristic substitute salvation becomes finer than ever. But the line still exists, and 
discernment between the two possibilities, though all the more difficult, is all the more 
crucial. For this reason, Cook’s description of therapeutic interventions as ‘a form of 
salvation … oriented towards human freedom and fulfilment’ does not seem to me 
entirely helpful, because it tends to obscure rather than clarify this line. However, his 
core understanding of the place and limits of clinical interventions appears quite close to 
what I have described as responsible penultimate activity. Such therapies could be 
considered penultimate insofar as they help clients overcome obstacles to living and 
acting responsibly towards God and neighbour, or open up a space in which they have 
the opportunity to locate their treatment in the context of questions about their ultimate 
goods, goals and ends.55 
 
                                                          
52 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 163. 
53 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III/4, trans. A. T. Mackay et al. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956), 
pp. 356-74; on medicine as a penultimate activity, see, e.g., Neil Messer, Flourishing: Health, Disease, 
and Bioethics in Theological Perspective (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013), pp. 181-2. 
54 Church Dogmatics, IV/1, p. 463 et passim.  
55 Cf Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, p. 189. 
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V/ Conclusion 
In this paper I set out to offer both a theological contribution to a particular neuroethical 
debate and a test-case of the capacity of a Reformed ethic to address new problems. I 
have tried to show how theological themes such as sin, grace and divine providence, as 
articulated in the Reformed tradition and its antecedents, offer a distinctive 
understanding of freedom and responsibility: an understanding that can fruitfully 
reframe and address puzzling questions about determinism, freewill and ethics. I hope 
that this account, partial and exploratory though it has been, has demonstrated the 
liveliness of this tradition, and the richness of its resources for responding to new 
occasions and the questions they generate. 
